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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 981794-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
MARCO VILLALOBOS,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for burglary of a dwelling, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and aggravated
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the
respective standards of appellate review:
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Did the trial judge improperly remark on defendant's

appearance and identity at trial?

1

I

Standard of Review. Because defense counsel did not object to any of the court's
remarks at trial, this issue is reviewed for plain error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 6, 4

'

P.3d 778.
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Was defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel
i

guaranteed by the United States Constitution?
Standard ofReview. When a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal andv
1

the record is adequate to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court
reviews the claim as a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998).Nevertheless, the Court "indulge[s] in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

i

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2065 (1984); accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186
(Utah 1990) (quoting).
THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Did the trial court fail to comply with section 77-18-

l(6)(a), Utah Code Annotated, by not resolving defendant's allegation that he was
erroneously assessed two points on the presentence investigation report for use of a board
during the robbery?

{

Standard ofReview. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty is
a question of law that [the appellate court] reviewfs] for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000
I

UT 62, f 13, — Utah Adv. Rep. —, — P.2d —.

\

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of section 77-18-l(6)(a), Utah Code Annotated, is relevant to a
determination of this case. That section provides:
The [Department of Corrections] shall provide the presentence investigation
report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by
counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report,
which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant and two co-perpetrators, Victor McDonald and William Screws, were
charged with burglary of a dwelling and aggravated robbery. R. 01-02, 63. A magistrate
took evidence at a preliminary hearing and bound defendant over for trial on both counts.
R. 08-09. Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 17-22, 54.
The trial court entered written findings of fact pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
(1995), finding that defendant acted in concert with two or more persons and that he was
therefore subject to an enhanced penalty under the statute.1

R. 61-63. The trial court

defendant was tried together with Victor McDonald who was also convicted. See
R. 17-22,63. William Screws pled guilty as charged and testified for the State. R. 63; R.
176: 121-22.
3

sentenced defendant to indeterminate prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for each offense.
R. 159-61. The court suspended imposition of the enhancement penalty. R. 162-63.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 170.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Robbery
In December 1997, Steven Tiede lived at his mother's house in a large bedroom built directly above the garage.2 R. 176: 47-48, 50. That month, he had broken up with his girlfriend, Tiffany Hill, over her association with another man, Victor McDonald. R. 176?
65-67,98-99. Two days before Christmas, Tiede received a telephone callfromMcDonald
and hisfriend,William Screws, at which time both men accused Tiede of physically abusing
Hill. R. 176: 113-14. In the early morning hours of the following day, Tiede and his then
current girlfriend, Ashley Cloward, lay asleep in bed when a black blazer driven by defendant
pulled into the driveway. See R. 176: 50-51, 98, 116, 127, 143, 151-52; R. 177: 295.
Defendant exited the blazer, as did McDonald and Screws. R. 63; R. 176: 51, 53, 154.
Defendant followed McDonald and Screws up the outside stairs of the home and into the
hallway where they began banging on Tiede's bedroom door. R. 63; R. 176: 51 -54; 151; R.
177: 257.3 When Tiede did not respond, Screws kicked in the door and the three entered the
bedroom. R. 176: 51,116-17,153-54.

2

Although the transcript of the trial spells Mr. Tiede's name "Teedy," the correct
spelling appears to be "Tiede" as reflected in his subpoena to appear in court. R. 55.
3

The outside staircase led to a small hallway on the second floor of the home,
providing access to Tiede's bedroom and to the main part of the house. R. 176: 47-48.
4

Once inside, defendant began searching the bedroom for marijuana as he and the other
two men had previously planned. R. 177: 258-59. Finding none, defendant turned his
attention to Tiede's personal belongings and began packing out valuables to the car. R. 176:
56-58, 69, 164, 166-67; R. 177: 259. Screws also joined defendant in rummaging through
the bedroom and taking Tiede's valuables. R. 176: 56-58, 119-20, 210, 215. Among the
items stolen by defendant and Screws were a CD stereo, a VCR, numerous CDs, a cable box,
a coat, and a black light. R. 176: 56-58, 68-69.
In the meantime, McDonald, periodically joined by Screws, angrily confronted Tiede,
accusing him of maligning McDonald to another person and of physically abusing Tiede's
former girlfriend, Tiffany Hill. R. 176: 55-57, 65-66, 85-87, 94-95, 117-18, 158-59, 211240; R. 177: 256. As McDonald yelled at Tiede with raised fists, Screws repeatedly tapped
Tiede on the chin with a board he had picked up on the way into the house. R. 176: 57,95,
142,160,163,165. When the two threatened to take Tiede outside and beat him up, Ashley
Cloward grabbed the telephone and dialed 9-1-1. R. 176: 58,160,165,195-96,217. Before
she could report the robbery, however, McDonald and Screws wrestled the telephone from
her, breaking it in the process. R. 58,160,191,211.
Hearing the commotion, Tiede's mother knocked on the wall asking Tiede to quiet
down. R. 176: 58,60,161-62,183. When Tiede sarcastically apologized to his mother and
responded that he was getting robbed, the three men assured her that everything was "cool,"
told her not to worry, andfledout the door. R. 176:84-85,165,181. With Tiede's valuables

5

in tow, defendant drove away from the home and dropped McDonald and Screws off at a
friend's house. R. 176: 120.
Identification of Defendant
Police later asked Tiede and Cloward if they recognized the robbers from a book
containing the booking photographs of various arrestees. R. 176: 97; R. 177:287-88. They
immediately identified McDonald as one of the robbers. R. 177: 288, 291. However,
because defendant's photograph was not very good, neither Tiede nor Cloward was able to-*'*
identify him as one of the robbers at that time. See R. 176: 80,97,172-73; R. 177:287-88,
291. R. 176:172-73. Tiede and Cloward also failed to identify Screws as one of the robbers.
See R. 196:97.
Sometime after McDonald's arrest for the home robbery, Tiede's car was stolen,
apparently while Tiede and Cloward were present in the car.4 SeeK. 176:122-23,220. After
the victims identified Screws as one of the perpetrators, Screws was arrested for aggravated
robbery. R. 177: 290-91. At that time, Cloward and Tiede also recognized Screws as the
second man involved in the earlier home robbery and he was charged accordingly, leaving
defendant still uncharged in the home robbery. See R. 177:290-91. Although defendant was
wearing a mask during the second robbery and apparently could not be identified by the
victims, he was implicated as one of the perpetrators in the second robbery and charged with
Screws. See R. 176: 220. Later, while testifying at the preliminary hearing on the second

4

The theft of the car resulted in the filing of aggravated robbery charges against
Screws and defendant. See R. 176: 123-24; R. 183: 18-19.
6

robbery—which preceded the preliminary hearing in this case, Cloward recognized defendant
as the third man involved in the home robbery. R. 176: 203, 220-21. After Cloward
informed the prosecutor and submitted a written statement to police, defendant was formally
charged in this case. R. 176: 203-04; R. 177: 291.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial Court Remarks. Defendant contends that the trial court's remarks which
touched on defendant's possible hispanic background and his physical appearance effectively
told the jury that the State had sufficiently proven identity. The remarks, however, were
made in the proper exercise of the court's duties in voir dire and in ruling on objections. They
did not constitute opinions on the strength of the State's evidence regarding identity or
otherwise. Moreover, to the extent the remarks were improper, any error was harmless. The
court plainly instructed the jury regarding its role as fact finder, the State's burden of proof
relating to identity, and the presumption of innocence. In addition, defendant's identity as
one of the robbers was not only established by the testimony of the two victims, but also by
one of the robbers.
Assistance of Counsel Defendant contends that counsel was ineffective by failing
to adequately advocate his client's cause, failing to adequately prepare for trial, and not
having adequate trial experience. Defendant's claims lack merit. The challenged remarks
by counsel were well within the realm of reasonable trial strategy and defendant has failed
to show prejudice in any event. Counsel's alleged misunderstanding regarding the victim
who could not independently identify defendant as one of the robbers was adequately
7

addressed during cross-examination.

Finally, any evidence that counsel lacked trial

experience was insufficient to establish that he was ineffective.
Objection to Presentence Investigation Report. The State agrees that the trial court
failed to resolve defendant's objection to the presentence investigation report. Accordingly,
the case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to resolve the objection in
accordance with statute. However, defendant does not argue on appeal, nor did he argue
below, that the alleged error affected his sentence. Accordingly, this Court should not disturb^

,m^

defendant's sentence.
ARGUMENT
I.

.,„«,-- -

^

ANYIMPROPERCOMMENTBYTHETRIALJUTCEONDEFXNDANT'S
IDENTITY OR APPEARANCE WAS HARMLESS.
Defendant first contends the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in a

way that signaled to the jury that the State had sufficiently identified defendant as one of the
robbers. Aplt. Brf. at 19. Specifically, defendant alleges that the trial judge improperly
i

remarked that: (1) defendant appeared to be hispanic; (2) the case was not about a "widow's
peak;" and (3) the witness had already testified that she believed defendant to have dark skin.
Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. Because defense counsel did not object to any of these remarks,

\

defendant must demonstrate that the trial judge's remarks amounted to plain error. Parker,
2000 UT 51,16. To do so, defendant mustfirstmeet the threshold burden of showing that
the judge's remarks constituted error. Id. at ^ 7 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208
(Utah 1993)). If he meets that threshold, defendant must demonstrate that the error was both
•'

8

1

plain and harmful. See id. (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208). In other words, "it should have
been obvious to [the] trial court that it was committing error" and the error must have been
"of sufficient magnitude" to create "a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome
below would have been more favorable." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)
(internal quotations omitted). Defendant has failed to meet that burden.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a court may not comment on the weight of the
evidence presented at trial or comment on the merits of the case in such a way that indicates
a preference toward either party." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975,980 (Utah 1998). None of
the challenged comments of the trial judge, when viewed in the context in which they were
given, constituted an inappropriate remark on the weight of the evidence nor did they imply
that the court held a preference toward the prosecution.
A.

The Trial Court's Voir Dire Comment That Defendant's Name
Suggested He Had a Hispanic Background Was Not Error.

Defendant first claims the judge improperly remarked at the beginning of trial that
defendant appeared to be hispanic . Aplt. Brf. at 19. He argues that the court's statement
directly related to Tiede's statement that one of the robbers was Mexican. Aplt. Brf. at 20.
However, a reading of the court's remark, in the context it was given, reveals that the
comment did not relate to Tiede's physical description of the robber as Mexican, but rather
appropriately explored jury bias during voir dire. Moreover, any error in the comment was
harmless.

9

During voir dire, the trial court explained its role in identifying jurors who may harbor
unwarranted biases. In this vein, the court stated:
You can see ladies and gentlemen as we are asking these questions there
is a true attempt on the part of the court to alleviate any bias that may linger at
all as it relates to anyone who may have any knowledge of the facts or have
formed any opinion or have a background that could influence a decision in
this case. So that we are not attempting to probe into your private lives or
anything for any other purpose than to seat a jury that will be fair.
Okay. Next, ladies and gentlemen, you can see that the one defendant is
Victor McDonald [who] appears to be an African American[.] Marco
Villalobos appears to have a Hispanic background of some sortfj at least a
name that would suggest that. I am going to ask you whether by virtue of that
mere fact that these defendants are minorities, would that in anyway affect
your ability, in this case, to listen carefully to the evidence[,] to weigh it
impartially and to reach a true and just and fair verdict? Okay.

**:,
^r
-

R. 176: 20 (emphasis added). In other words, the judge did not, as defendant suggests,
indicate that defendant physically appeared to be hispanic. Rather, the judge indicated that
based on defendant's name, he appeared to have a "hispanic background." R. 176: 20
(emphasis added). Tiede testified that he had seen defendant before, but that he did not know
his name. See R. 176: 53, 73. As such, the trial court's comment that defendant appeared
to have an hispanic background based on his name in no way relates to Tiede's physical
description of the robber as being Mexican.
Moreover, the trial court's inquiry regarding racial or ethnic biases was consistent
with its duty to ferret out those who could not render fair and impartial judgment because of
personal biases or prejudices. As held by the Utah Supreme Court, "[v]oir dire is intended
to provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully determine, by inquiry,

10

whether biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial
if a particular juror serves in it." State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984).
In any event, defendant has failed to adequately explain how the remark was
prejudicial. He fails to demonstrate that the allegedly improper comment was "of sufficient
magnitude" as to create "a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below
would have been more favorable." Verde, 770 P.2d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). In
the first place, to the extent the remarks were improper at all, the trial court remedied any
error by appropriately instructing the jury. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah
1998) (holding that "curative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial
process and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial").
Rule 19(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "if the [trial] court refers to any
of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact." In accordance with that rule, the trial court below specifically instructed the jury
members that they .were "the sole judges of all questions of fact, of the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses." R. 32. The court also made it clear to the jury
that the identification of the defendant was critical to the case, instructing the jury as follows:
One of the issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the
person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the
defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, after considering all
of the evidence you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant
not guilty. If, however, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is the person who committed the crime then you must return a
verdict of guilty.
11

R. 45. The court further instructed the jury that "[t]hQ identification testimony that [they]
heard was an expression of belief or impression by the witness which may or may not be
accurate" and the court then identified factors which the jury should consider in assessing the
accuracy of the identification. R. 45 (emphasis added). Later, the trial court cautioned the
jury as follows:
Neither in these Instructions nor in any ruling, action, or remark that I
have made during the course of this trial have I intended to interpose any
opinion or suggestion as to how I would resolve any of the issues of this case.

:

zfr£
^&

R.40.
The foregoing instructions plainly advised the jury that the State had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's identity as one of the three robbers. The
instructions clearly advised the jury that they were the sole judges of the evidence and that
any remarks or actions by the court should not be regarded as an opinion on the strength of
the evidence. Therefore, to the extent the court's voir dire comment was improper at all, it
was not "so prejudicial as to defeat the mitigating effect of the court's... instructions." See
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f24, 999 P.2d 7. The instructions were strong and direct,
mitigating any innocuous comment by the trial judge in properly exercising his duties.
Moreover, defendant does not contend that he does not appear to be hispanic. Atrial
court cannot prejudice a defendant by stating that which is obvious to the jury. Additionally,
both Tiede and Cloward positively identified defendant at trial as the third robber and
testified that he stole personal belongings from Tiede's room. R. 176: 53-54, 56-58, 155,
166-67. Their testimony was fully corroborated by one of the three robbers, William Screws,
12

who testified that defendant was in fact one of the three men who participated in the robbery.
Screws testified that defendant drove him and McDonald to Tiede's house, knowing of their
intention to confront Tiede and take marijuana. R. 176: 115-16, 120. He testified that after
they broke into the bedroom, defendant took property from Tiede's room. R. 176: 119-20.
Finally, he testified that defendant drove them away from the scene, dropping Screws and
McDonald off, along with the stolen property, at a friend's home. R. 176: 120.
B.

The Trial Court's Explanatory Remark Cutting off Further
Questions Regarding a "Widow's Peak" Was Proper.

Defendant also challenges the trial court's remark about the "widow's peak." Aplt.
Brf. at 19. That remark, however, was made in the context of a ruling on an objection and
was not improper. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Ashley Cloward
regarding her prior statement that the "Mexican" robber had a widow's peak. See R. 176:
175. Pointing to defendant at trial, defense counsel asked Cloward if he had a widow's peak.
R. 176: 175. She testified that defendant's hair^was now (at the trial) different, that it was
longer, cut different; and down. R. 176:175. She reiterated, however, that at the time of the
robbery, defendant's hair was slicked back and that "he had a line and then a little peak and
then a line." R. 176:175. Defense counsel then directed defendant to pull back his hair and
asked, "That is a Widow's Peak?" R. 176:175. Cloward testified in the affirmative. R. 176:
175.
After further questioning Cloward's characterization of defendant's hair as having a
widow's peak, as well as her failure to identify defendant in the mug book, counsel asked,

13

"How big does it have to be before it is a Widow's Peak?" R. 176: 176. The prosecutor
objected and the court sustained the objection. R. 176: 176. Defense counsel responded that
they were "talking about a very identifiable characteristic" that he didn't believe defendant
had. R. 176: 176. When the prosecutor rejoined that the witness had just testified that
defendant had a widow's peak, the trial court stated:
Well, the complication is that she has identified it and she has identified it on
him today and you can say for argument that he doesn't have a Widow's Peak
or he does have a Widow's Peak and she has testified that he does. Now this
case is not about a Widow's Peak.

•?

R. 176:176.
The Utah Supreme has held that '"the extent of cross-examination with respect to an
appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court" and it may
therefore "'exercise a reasonable judgment in determining when the subject is exhausted."'
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989) {quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129,
132, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750 (1968)), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990). The
Court has also recognized that "trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant." State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368,1372 (Utah 1989). The trial
court's remark was made in the proper exercise of its discretion in determining that the
subject had been adequately exhausted.5 In so ruling, the court implicitly held that

defendant has not claimed on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in
cutting off further questioning, and, in any case, the court later permitted further
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defendant's alleged widow's peak had been adequately explored and further questioning
would be cumulative or create a risk of confusing the issues. In short, the remark was
explanatory in nature and was appropriate in the context of the court's ruling on the
objection. See Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 980 (finding that a trial judge's remarks did not constitute
reversible error in part because they were "merely explanatory in nature").
Moreover, any error in making the comment was harmless. As discussed above, the
court gave accurate and succinct instructions advising the jury regarding the State's burden
of proof with respect to identity, the presumption of innocence, and the role of the jury as fact
finder. Moreover, in addition to these instructions, which were given after all parties had
rested, the court gave the following clarifying instruction shortly after its remark that the case
was not about a widow's peak: 195-96.
Ladies and Gentlemen, a few moments ago I did not allow any additional questions
regarding a Widow's Peak and I indicated that this case is not about a Widow's Peak.
Let me clarify that if I will. Issues of identification are always important in a
criminal case. I sustained the objection because I considered the phrase or the focus
to be inappropriate. But I am going to allow him, counsel, to explore the within the
bounds to explore her perception of the Widow's Peak. With that, we will simply
clarify that the issues of identification including a Widow's Peak are always
important in a criminal case, always. So I may have sustained the objection as it
relates to the nature of the question but counsel may now proceed and ask questions
regarding the issue of a Widow's Peak. Please disregard any comments that I have
made in connection with the earlier objection.
R. 176:197. This instruction, given in the midst oftrial when the issue was fresh in the jury's
mind, again advised the jury that the issue of identification was important in the case and
expressly directed the jury to disregard any comments which could be construed as stating

questioning on the subject. See infra, p. ??.
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otherwise. Accordingly, to the extent the court's explanatory remark improperly commented
on the evidence, any harm occasioned by the remark was rendered benign by the instructions.
See Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f24. Counsel had explored the subject ad nauseum, Cloward
maintained that he had a widow's peak, and the jury could judge her credibility in that regard
based on its own observation of defendant.
C.

^

The Trial Court's Explanatory Remark Cutting off Further
Questions Regarding Defendant's Skin Color Was Proper.

Defendant also complains that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence
in its remark concerning Cloward's description of defendant as having dark skin. Aplt. Brf.
at 19-20. Again, however, defendant has not placed the court's remark in the context in
which it was given. As in the other two challenged remarks, a reading of the transcript
reveals that the trial court's comment did not constitute an improper comment on the
evidence.
During counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Cloward, she testified that Mexicans have
"dark hair" and that their complexion is darker. R. 176: 171. She then testified that she
described the robber as Mexican because he had dark hair and his complexion was darker.
R. 176: 171-72. However, to undermine her assessment that the third robber was Mexican,
counsel elicited testimony from Cloward that the robber also could have been Italian or
Iranian. R. 176: 172. He then asked her, "Isn't it true that this kind of became a self
fulfilling prophecy and you thought he was a Mexican and you became hell bent on finding
a Mexican?" R. 176: 172. Cloward responded, "Kind of." R. 176: 172.
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On re-cross examination, Cloward again testified that defendant "is darker complexed
[sic] and he has dark hair." R. 176: 199. Counsel questioned this characterization of
defendant, and attempted to elicit the standard by which Cloward determined who has dark
skin by asking her to identify jurors or celebrities who have dark skin. R. 176: 199-201. The
prosecutor objected to counsel's line of questioning on the grounds that the witness had
already testified that she considered defendant to have dark skin and that she had already
defined dark skin in her vernacular. R. 176: 201. When defense counsel retorted that the
jury did not know her vernacular, the trial court held:
The jury knows her vernacular because she has identified this gentleman and
has indicated that he has dark skin. They can see and they know and whether
that is their perception or not it doesn't matter. I will sustain the objection of
counsel.
R. 176:201.
The trial court's remarks, therefore, like its remarks regarding the widow's peak, were
merely explanatory in nature in sustaining the prosecutor's objection. SeeAlonzo, 973 P.2d
at 980. The court had already heard extensive testimony from Cloward as to whom she
considered to have dark skin and her opinion that defendant had dark skin. Consistent with
its broad discretion in managing the examination of witnesses, the trial court concluded that
the subject had been exhausted and further questioning on the subject was unnecessary. See
Gardner, 789 P.2d at 281.
Moreover, and as in the other two challenged remarks, any impropriety in the
comment was harmless. The court adequately instructed the jury regarding its role as fact
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finder and the State's burden of proving identity. Supra, at 11 -12. The court also instructed
the jury that none of its remarks should be construed as offering an opinion on the strength
of the evidence. R. 40. Finally, the jury could see for themselves whether or not defendant
could fairly be characterized as having dark skin.
* * *

In summary, none of the challenged remarks by the trial court constituted error,
obvious or otherwise. Trial counsel understood the remarks for what they were—reasonable
explanations given by the court in the context of the trial. For this reason he did not object.
To the extent that they could be considered error, the comments were not of a nature that "it
should have been obvious to [the] trial court that it was committing error." One remark was
made in an effort to ensure an unbiased jury and two were made in explaining the court's
decision to sustain objections. Verde, 770 P.2d at 122. Moreover, given the strongly-worded
and salient instructions regarding the jury's role as fact finder and the State's burden to
establish identity, it cannot be said, as defendant contends, that the trial court in effect told
the jury "that the State had sufficiently proven identity and identity was therefore no longer
at issue." See Aplt. Brf. at 21. Moreover, in light of the eyewitness testimony that defendant
was one of the three robbers, any arguably inappropriate comments by the trial judge were
not "of sufficient magnitude" to create "a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the
outcome below would have been more favorable." Verde, 770P.2dat 122.
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II. DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
Defendant next claims that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 21. Defendant makes
numerous allegations of deficient performance which can be divided into the following
categories: (1) failure to advocate defendant's cause; (2) failure to adequately prepare for
trial; and (3) inadequate trial experience.6 These claims are frivolous.
When, as here, a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the record
is adequate to review an ineffectiveness claim, this Court reviews the claim as a matter of
law. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Nevertheless, the Court 4"indulge[s] in the strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'"
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). To
succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must meet the two-prong test set forth in
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S.Ct. 2052,2064 (1984). A conviction will
not be reversed unless the defendant meets "the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial
counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." Chacon,
962 P.2d at 50. Because defendant must meet both prongs of the test, the Court "may address

6

The State has treated defendant's first and fifth allegations of ineffective
assistance, Aplt. Brf. at 22,24, under the same general category. Defendant's third and
fourth allegations of ineffective assistance, Aplt. Brf. at 22-24, are also treated under the
same general category.
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whichever [prong] will most readily resolve the claim." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580
(Utah App. 1993) {citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2069).
A.

Trial Advocacy.
1.

The Challenged Remarks Were Strategic Techniques to Further
the Defense.

"Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties," including "the:,
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct.
at 2065. Defendant contends that his trial counsel failed in that duty in several ways. He
contends that counsel failed to show a willingness to identify himself with his interests byr

:

indicating that he would rather be teaching Spanish. Aplt. Brf. at 22. He also complains that
trial counsel created a negative impression of him by referring to the "Dam [sic] Sure Rule,"
and comparing him to President Clinton. Aplt Brf. at 24; see R. 176: 228-29. Defendant,

\

however, neither explains the context in which the statements were given, nor does he
explain how they undermine confidence in the trial's ultimate outcome. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694, 104 S.Gt. at 2068.
When asked to identify himself to the venire panel, defense counsel gave his name and
indicated that he was happily married and had four little girls. R. 176: 16. He then stated:
"I am a lawyer but love teaching Spanish in a high school in Salt Lake. That is what I would
rather be doing today." R. 176: 16. He then indicated that he had a law firm in Salt Lake
City, with two other lawyers, that primarily represented indigent people. R. 176: 16. The
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statement was innocuous, given in an introduction about himself and what he did. It did not
imply in any manner that he believed his client to be guilty or unworthy of a defense.
Counsel's reference to the "Dam [sic] Sure Rule" came in his opening statement as
he explained the burden required of the State to prove defendant's guilt. Counsel explained:
In the United States of America we believe that a person should not go
to prison if there is reasonable doubt. That doesn't mean that a person should
go to prison if the jury just thinks someone is guilty. It is what I like to call the
Dam [sic] Sure Rule. That is the rule.
R. 176: 228. Following this remark, the court asked counsel to approach the bench,
apparently asking him to refrain from using the word "damn." See R. 176: 228. Counsel
then continued:
I will start over. In the United States, we don't convict people of crimes
if there is a reasonable doubt that they are innocent. It is not enough that
somebody thinks that I think that person did that. That is not enough. In civil
trials, if you top the scales against somebody the person who has the scales
tipped against them looses [sic] anything above 50 percent.
That is not the case here. We are dealing with, I mean in Utah County we
are dealing with a Darn Sure Rule here. You got to be dam sure. As I am
putting on my case[,] I want you to ask yourselves are you dam sure that my
client is lying? Are you dam sure that his mother is lying? Are you dam sure
that his brother is lying? Are you dam sure that the evidence is so against my
client that he just couldn't be telling the truth and you just can't believe him
in simply thinking that he might not be telling the truth. That isn't enough.
R. 176: 228. As is readily apparent from this context, the statement did not, as defendant
suggests, cast him in a negative light. It was simply a phrase used by counsel to help him
describe for the jury the heavy burden of proof the State must meet to attain a conviction.
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Finally, counsel did not, as defendant suggests, compare him to President Clinton in
the sense that he lied or was untrustworthy. Reference to President Clinton was made during
counsel's opening statement and in the context of explaining reasonable doubt and the
presumption of innocence. Counsel stated:
The President of the United States, Bill Clinton, we see a presumption of
the innocence. The guy is accused and people jump to his side and say that
well, you know that isn't necessary. We might be a people who say these
things and you look at them one by one but none of them are credible.
Now my client is just as much a citizen of this country as the President
is. He is entitled to the same degree of reasonable doubt as he is.

.?-?

:^

R. 176: 229. After the prosecutor objected to the reference of a pending case, counsel\~..?r$m$.
concluded:
Thank you, Judge. Every citizen is entitled to the same evidentiary
standard, whether it is the highest citizen of the land or the lowest[,] the same
evidentiary standard. That is what we are going to ask you to apply as you
hear our case, thank you.
R. 176:230. In other words, counsel's reference to President Clinton was to the presumption
of innocence to which not only a president was entitled, but also to which his client was
entitled. It did not impugn defendant's character, but helped explain his rights and the jury's
obligation.
* * *

In short, counsel's revelation to the jury that he would rather be teaching Spanish was
a simple tactic to personalize himself to the jury, demonstrating that he, like the jury, had
interests other than the case at bar. Likewise, his remarks about the "Damn Sure Rule" and
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President Clinton were techniques to help him explain the State's burden of proof and the
presumption of innocence. The courts have long recognized that "trial tactics and strategies
are within counsel's prerogative and are generally left to counsel's professional judgment."
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993). If, as is clearly the case here, "the
challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, [this Court] will not find
that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225.
2.

The Challenged Remarks Did Not Prejudice the Defense.

In any case, defendant wholly fails to explain how the statements prejudiced his
defense. It is not enough to claim that the statements created a negative impression of
defendant in the jury's minds or that they demonstrated counsel's unwillingness to identify
himself with defendant's interests. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067
(holding that "[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding"). Defendant has not shown, as is his
burden, that absent the remarks, a reasonable probability exits that "the factfinder would have
had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 695,104 S.Ct. at 2068-69.
The statement that counsel would prefer to be teaching Spanish personalized counsel
to the jury and was isolated. The references to the "Dam [sic] Sure Rule" and President
Clinton were tools in explaining legal principles. Moreover, as explained supra, at 12-13,
the evidence against defendant was compelling—not only did the two victims testify that
defendant was one of the three robbers, but one of the three robbers confirmed that
testimony. R. 176: 53-54,56-58,115-16,119-20,155,166-67. Moreover, the record shows
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that counsel vigorously represented defendant's interests throughout the trial. In closing,
counsel argued to the jury that the case against defendant was "pathetically weak." R. 177:
313. He attacked Tiede's identification of defendant in court, pointing out his inability to
identify him in the mug book. R. 177: 314. He pointed out inconsistencies in the witnesses
statements. R. 177:314-15. He pointed out that none ofdefendant's fingerprints were lifted from the scene although the testimony indicated that he had his hands on everything in the

v
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bedroom. R. 177: 316. In short, defendant has failed to demonstrate "a reasonable ^

:

probability that, absent the [remarks], the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt " respecting guilt." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695,104 S.Ct. at 2068-69.
B.

«•**

Trial Preparation.

Defendant also argues that his attorney's cross-examination of Tiede, as reported on
pages 71 -73 of the transcript, demonstrate that he did not adequately prepare for trial. Aplt.
Brf. at 22 (pages 70-74 of the transcript are reproduced in Addendum A). Defendant's claim
is unsubstantiated.
Defendant first claims the transcript demonstrates that counsel first interviewed Tiede
only a few minutes before cross-examination. Aplt. Brf. at 22. That is not the case. Tiede
had just testified during cross-examination by McDonald's attorney that he had not talked
to Ashley Cloward about the case since it happened and that he did not really associate with
her anymore. R. 176:69-70. Defendant's counsel then impeached this testimony, eliciting
from Tiede that he worked with her for a short time and may have had up to twenty
conversations with her since the incident. R. 176:70-71. However, when Tiede maintained
24
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that they had not talked about the case, counsel asked: "Then why did you tell me in the hall
just a couple of minutes ago or a couple of hours ago that the reason that Ashley knew who
my client was was [sic] after the second robbery somebody told her it was Marco
Villalobos?" R. 176: 72. That question only reveals that counsel spoke with Tiede either a
couple of minutes before trial, or more likely, a couple of hours before trial. That he spoke
with Tiede on the day of trial is not surprising and was indeed prudent. In any case, the fact
that counsel spoke with Tiede on the day of trial does not mean he did not speak with him
previously and the testimony did not suggest that he did not.
Defendant also contends the exchange demonstrates that counsel "failed to grasp an
understanding of the facts of the case." Aplt. Brf. at 22. He fails, however, to identify what
facts counsel did not grasp and how, in any case, that misunderstanding prejudiced his
defense. Counsel's questioning does suggest that he understood that Coward's identification
of defendant was based on a third party's statement. R. 176: 72. Further questioning,
however, revealed that it was Tiede, not Cloward, who had only learned of defendant's
identityfroma third party. R. 176:72. He thus testified: "/was told by somebody else that
yes, he is the one." R. 176:72 (emphasis added). Accordingly, although the exchange may
show counsel confused the person who did not have independent knowledge of defendant's
identity, it clearly establishes that counsel understood that one of the two witnesses did not
have that independent knowledge and that he effectively elicited that testimony.
Defendant also argues counsel failed to follow up on Tiede's concession that he did
not have independent knowledge and instead apologized to the judge. The concession,
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however, and the point, was already made: Tiede did not have independent knowledge that
defendant was in fact the Mexican robber. No follow up was necessary. Moreover,
counsel's apology was made in an abundance of civility and simply for attributing the lack
of independent knowledge to Cloward rather than Tiede.
Finally, defendant has failed to show prejudice. Even if counsel had only interviewed,,
Tiede minutes before trial, even if he did not fully grasp who it was that did not have^
independent knowledge of defendant's identity, and even if he should not have apologized . ^
for any misunderstanding but followed up on Tiede's response, defendant has not identified
what testimony counsel would have otherwise elicitedfromTiede or how that would have
affected the outcome of the trial. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 1994)
(holding that the defendant did not meet the prejudice prong of Strickland where he did not
detail what further investigation would have revealed). Having failed to do so, defendant has
not met the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct.
at 2065. All defendant can show is that had he more carefully interviewed Tiede, he would
have known that Tiede, not Cloward, learned of defendant's identity as the third robber from
a third party. However, through counsel's effective cross-examination, that fact was
ultimately revealed. Accordingly, no reasonable probability exists that absent the alleged
deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See State v. Smith,
909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995).
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C.

Trial Experience.

Finally, defendant claims in his third and fourth claims of alleged deficient
performance that his trial counsel did not sufficiently understand the rules of evidence and
did not otherwise have sufficient trial experience. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. However, as aptly
observed by the United States Supreme Court, "[ejvery experienced criminal defense
attorney once tried his first criminal case." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665,104
S.Ct. 2039, 2050 (1984). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated that "[a]n
attorney can render effective assistance of counsel even if he has had no prior experience in
criminal advocacy." United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278,1281 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth
Circuit held that "[wjhether the defendant has been afforded hisrightto counsel depends on
whether the attorney is reasonably likely to render and does render reasonably effective
assistance, not on whether counsel has an extensive background in criminal defense work."
Id. at 1281-82 (internal quotations omitted). Defendant here has failed to show that trial
counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance.
Screws9 Hearsay Statements to Defendant's Mother. Defendant points to his
counsel's attempt to elicit testimonyfromdefendant's mother regarding a conversation she
had at the jail with William Screws, the robber who testified on behalf of the State. Aplt.
Brf. at 22-23. Counsel was met with objections based on inadequate foundation and hearsay,
including objections to his efforts to admit them as an admission of a party-opponent or as
a prior inconsistent statement. R. 176:234-38. Defendant is correct that counsel had some
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initial difficulty in establishing the necessary foundation. However, he ultimately did so after
the court indicated what additional questions he needed to ask. R. 176: 234-36.
Thus, no possible prejudice resulted in his initial failed efforts to elicit the hearsay
statements because defendant's mother was ultimately allowed to testify about the statements
without objection. She testified that Screws' told her he had to testify against defendant or he would get a longer prison sentence. R. 176: 246. She further testified that he never told —
her "that he was told just to tell the truth." R. 176: 246. Having elicited the desired7-

-

testimony, counsel cannot be said to have either performed deficiently or that his initiallystrained efforts prejudiced the defense.

;c;^t^

Impeachment of Ashley Cloward. Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he inadequately impeached Ashley Cloward regarding her statement that
one of the robber's was dark complexioned. Aplt. Brf. at 24. He focuses on counsel's
request, which was met with a successful objection, that she point to a juror whom she
believed had a dark complexion. Aplt Brf. at 24; see R. 176: 199-200. Although he may
have exhibited an unfamiliarity with the law in this regard, the question did not amount to
unconstitutionally deficient performance. Indeed, if every unsuccessful attempt to elicit
testimony from a witness constituted unconstitutionally deficient performance, all cases
would result in reversal. Counsel in fact successfully impeached Coward's description,
eliciting testimony that the robber also could have been Italian or Iranian. R. 176:172. He
also elicited her concession that her original description of the robber became "kind o f a
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"self-fulfilling prophecy" because she "thought he was a Mexican and [therefore] became
hell bent on finding a Mexican." See R. 176: 172.
Defendant also complains that trial counsel should not have withdrawn his attempt to
re-call Cloward for further testimony on the hairnet defendant wore during the robbery. Aplt.
Brf. at 23. Although the court had not ruled on the objection of the co-defendant's attorney,
counsel for defendant nevertheless decided not to call Cloward. R. 176: 243. On appeal,
defendant argues that by abandoning his attempt to re-call Cloward, he missed an opportunity
to cast further doubt on her testimony. Aplt. Brf. at 24. Yet, he does not indicate how that
testimony could have been further challenged. "[PJroof of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at
877. Defendant's claim here must therefore fail.
Cross-examination of Officer Gasman. Defendant also complains that counsel was
ineffective because he did not ask Officer Gusman if Tiede and Cloward had identified
defendant in the mug book. Aplt. Brf. at 24. He argues that the question should have been
asked because counsel had already unsuccessfully attempted to elicit that testimony from
Tiede himself. Aplt. Brf. at 24. That contention is not supported by the record. On crossexamination by defendant's counsel, Tiede was initially unsure whether he identified
defendant in the mug book. R. 176: 80. However, on further cross-examination, Tiede
testified that he did not believe he identified him. R. 176: 80. Later, on cross-examination
by McDonald's attorney, Tiede unequivocally testified that he did not identify defendant.
He testified that although he identified McDonald, he was unable to identify defendant when
29

police asked him to identify the other two robbers from one or two mug books. R. 176: 97.
Because f iede had already testified that he could not identify defendant from the mug books,
trial counsel had no need to question Officer Gusman on the subject. Ashley Cloward also
clearly testified that she was unable to identify defendant from the mug book. R. 176: 17273. Therefore, counsel's decision not to further question Officer Gusman about their
inability to identify defendant from the mug book was not deficient, but a reasonable
strategic choice.7

••'&£*

III. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF
ALLOWING THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.

^

Finally, defendant argues the trial court failed to comply with section 77-18-1 (6)(a),
Utah Code Annotated, when it failed to address defendant's allegation that he was
erroneously given two points for use of a weapon—a board—on the "Criminal History
Assessment" section of the presentence investigation report (PSI). Aplt. Brf. at 25.8
Defendant argues that consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jaeger,

7

Defendant also claims trial counsel was ineffective because during his opening
statement, he remarked that "he did not know of any rule preventing himfrommaking
argument during opening statement" Aplt. Brf. at 23. Defendant, however, fails to
demonstrate how this prejudiced his defense. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50.
defendant also claims that he "pointed out several inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report to the trial judge," but does not otherwise identify those inaccuracies.
Aplt. Brf. at 26. The appellate court will not address unidentified inaccuracies because
the burden rests on the appellant to clearly identify any alleged errors, cite to the record
where the alleged errors occurred, and explain why such errors constituted reversible
error. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988). Defendant has not met his
burden.
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1999 UT 1,973 P.2d 404, this case should be remanded with instructions that the trial court
comply with section 77-18-l(6)(a). The State agrees the case should be remanded for the
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to comply with section 77-18-1 (6)(a) by resolving
defendant's objection to the PSI. The sentence, however, should not be disturbed.
Section 77-18-1 (6)(a) provides in relevant part as follows:
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have
not been resolved by the parties and the [Department of Corrections] prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 1995). As explained by the Court in Jaeger,
compliance with this section "requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is
accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant to the issue of
sentencing." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a
legal duty is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness." Veteto,
2000UT62,f 13.
Although defendant did not personally possess a board, the PSI assessed defendant
two points for use of a board during the commission of the robbery. See PSI, Form 3.9 At
sentencing, counsel for defendant objected to that score, arguing as follows:

9

The PSI is part of the record in a white envelope, but was not indexed.
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On the PSI, Judge, criminal history assessment-the weapons enhancement, Mr.
Villalobos has been given two points because it says he had a weapon which
was other board. It's my understanding from the trial of this matter—although
I was not trial counsel, but it's my understanding that it was Mr. William's
[sic] Screws that had the board. Mr. Villalobos did not have it. So we 'd ask
that those two points be taken off which would move him to an eight. He 'd still
be in a moderate category, but I believe it would make a difference in front of
a parole board.
R. 183:12-13 (emphasis added). When counsel asked the court whether it wanted to respond
or if it wished him to proceed with argument relating to sentencing, the court directed him
to proceed with his full argument. R. 183: 13. The court, however, sentenced defendant
without resolving the alleged inaccuracy. SeeR. 183:18-21. As noted above, section 77-18l(6)(a) is clear in requiring the trial court to consider defendant's objections to the PSI and
make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is accurate. See
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44. The court's failure to do so was error and the case should therefore
be remanded for resolution of the objection in accordance with section 77-18-1 (6)(a).l0
As in Jaeger, however, defendant has not argued, nor did he argue at sentencing, that
the alleged error affected his sentence, and therefore, reversal is not required. Id. at % 45.
At sentencing, counsel for defendant effectively conceded that the error was irrelevant to the
sentencing recommendation, acknowledging that defendant would remain in the moderate
criminal history category, but arguing that the lower score <4would make a difference in front
of a parole board." R. 183: 13. Likewise on appeal, defendant has not argued that the
alleged inaccuracy affected his sentence.
10

The State defers argument to the trial court on the issue of whether use of a
weapon by a co-participant in the crime can be attributed to defendant in the PSI scoring.
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Nor could defendant argue that the alleged inaccuracy affected his sentence. The
court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years. R. 183: 18.
The court did not impose the gang enhancement penalty as recommended in the PSL R. 183:
19; PSI, Agency Recommendation. However, because defendant had also been convicted
of and sentenced for the robbery involving Tiede's car, the court ordered that defendant's
sentence be served consecutively with that sentence. R. 183: 18. The sentence would not
have in any way been affected by the PSI score. In the first place, the court was well aware
that defendant did not possess the weapon. See R. 183:13. In the second place, the scoring
in no way affected defendant's criminal history categorization. Defendant's total placement
score was 10, placing him in the moderate criminal history category. See PSI, Form 3.
Because the moderate category includes those with scores between 8 and 11, defendant
would have fallen into that category even if the two points for the weapons enhancement had
not been assessed.11 Thus, whether or not defendant was given two points for the weapons
enhancement, the recommendation of a $2,500 fine and incarceration of 24 months under the
general disposition and time matrices would have been the same. PSI, Forms 3-4.
Accordingly, defendant's sentence should be affirmed even on its merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of
u

The criminal history categories, together with their corresponding point totals,
are as follows: Excellent (0-3 points); Good (4-7 points); Moderate (8-11 points); Fair
(12-15 points); and Poor (16-28 points). PSI, Form 3.
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resolving defendant's objection to the presentence investigation report in full compliance
with section 77-18-1 (6)(a).
Respectfully submitted this o/| day of August, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

rfE0REY S. GRAY
^-ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
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A. Nope, probably no.
Q. All right. That is all I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, you may Cross Examine.
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. SMITH:
Q. Mr. Teedy, you understand what perjury is? Do you know what perjury is?
A. No.
Q. How do you feel about lying in court?
A. Against it
Q. You are against it?
A. Yes.
Q. How much SO percent, 60 percent or can you give me a percentile?
A. 100 percent.
Q. 100 percent against lying in court?
A. Yes.
Q. You talked in the hallway just a couple of hours ago right?
A. Yes.
Q. You just told counsel thai you have not spoken to Ashley since this apparent
second robbery correct?
A. Well, I don't hang around with her but I guess she might call and say that hey
something is wrong with my car, can you find one of yourfriendsto fix it or
something like that. So I do speak with her but we don't sit down and talk and the
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like, I don't know.
Q. So none ofthat I don't know stuff?
A. Just kind of basically if she called me she wants something like me to help her
out or something. We don't sit there and talk for recreation or whatever.
Q. So you have talked to her five times, ten times, fifteen times since this ?
A. Probably that is right
Q. Ten times?
A. I worked with her for a while after the second robbery.
Q. So about ten times is that fair?
A. Probably worked with her more than ten times at work.
Q. Maybe 20 conversations with her?
A. Yes, but I don't know. I didn't count
Q. So the truth is somewhere between zero what you told him and 20?
THE COURT: Counsel, approach the bench if you will please?

(WHEREUPON, an off the record discussion was held at the bench)

THE COURT: Back on the record. Counselor, you may continue.

BYMR. SMITH:
Q. I am going to clarify my question to you?
A. Allright
Q. Have you spoken about this case with Ashley since this second robbery?
A. No.
Q. Notatall?
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A. No.
Q. Okay. Then why did you tell me in the hall just a couple of minutes ago or a
couple of hours ago that the reason that Ashley knew who my client was was after the
second robbery somebody told her it was Marco Villalobos?
A. Someone told me.
Q. So someone told you that?
A. Someone told me it was "Sniper" Marco.
Q. You didn't tell me that somebody told Ashley that it was Marco and she told
you?
A. You misunderstood me. I don't know how she figured it out on her own. I
didn't have to tell her or nothing. She already knew.
Q. Okay.
A. I was told by somebody else that yes, he is the one.
Q. That he was the one?
A. Yes.
Q. Up until that pointA. No, I have a strong belief, I know myself not that I know.
Q. But did you not tell me that up until that conversation which somebody told
you apparently that it was Marco Villalobos that you had never identified my client
correct?
A. I was not offered a police line up or nothing so I don't know. I never got to see
his face like in person and I would have just, yes that is him at the time. Then months
later he showed him to me again and I don't know.
Q. Okay. I need to take a second and apologize, Judge. It was my understanding
that counsel asked if he had spoken to Ashley at all since the second robbery. I
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1 apologize to the jury and to Your Honor to the witness but you haven't spoken to her
2 about this case at all?
\

3

A. No.

4

Q. Now when you initially spoke to the police officer, did you not tell the police

5 officer that you had seen the Mexican before and that you had seen the Mexican
6 before?
7

A. Yes, told buddies.

8

Q. And that the Mexican was named "Lazy"?

9

A. He could. I never said but I said that he could be "Lazy" and that is his name

10 but the guy that robbed me could be going under the name of "Lazy", he could. Have
11 you got a picture of "Lazy" show me a picture of "Lazy"? If they had a picture of
12 "Lazy" and I knew him by "Lazy" they would show me a picture and I would be able
13 to identify him. That is just all I was saying. I wasn't saying that it was "Lazy". That
14 is him. I don't have to see a picture or nothing. I was just trying to come to some
15 kind of where we both maybe they had his name down as that and they know. Then
16 they showed me a picture of "Lazy" and I could see that it wasn't him.
17

Q. But you made it very clear that you had seen the Mexican before? You made

18 that clear to the officer correct?
19

A. Yes.

20

Q.Okay.

21

A. For sure.

22

Q. So you had seen the Mexican before?

23

A. Yes, I don't know his name and wasn't around him a lot.

24

Q. Then you told me and correct me if I am wrong, then you told me that when

25 this Mexican-
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A. Yes.
Q. — came into your bedroomA. Yes.
Q. - that he was a foot and a half to two feet awayfromyou?
A. Yes, he come in and he would be looking down and he would not really
making eye contact and kind of, he came and looked at me once and then he just off
doing his own thing.
Q.And then you told me the reason why you couldn't identify him in a mug shot
or at a hearing the reason that you couldn't identify him was that I really didn't get a
good look at him?
A. Yes.
Q. If I may. So you didn't really get a good look at him?
A. Yes.
Q. Did I then not say to you, did not this Mexican leave and come back at least
two other times and what did you say to me when I asked that?
A. I don't know I wasn't counting.
Q. Didn't you tell me that he had left his car and come back at least two times?
A. Yes, I am sure.
Q. And then I asked you to describe his appearance right?
A. Yes.
Q. You told me he was wearing a black coat right?
A. Yes and I am not too sure what he was wearing. I wasn't trying to see what
they were wearing. Had a hair net on them.
Q. Had a hair net on and you said that if he had a tail it must have been the hair
net because, you would have remembered something like that?

